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Information is flowing through wires and air all around us, from one computing device to
another, frequently finding a resting place on storage media along the way. Given the ubiquity
of digital data, criminal activity today often leaves digital traces stored on or transmitted using
computers. Law enforcement and regulatory agencies have recognized that they cannot afford
to overlook these traces and are therefore devoting resources to the collection and forensic
examination of digital evidence. The resulting evidence provides an abundance of information
that can be useful when investigating a crime. Even if digital evidence does not contain the
“smoking gun,” it can reveal actions, positions, origins, associations, activities, and sequences
useful for reconstructing the events surrounding an offense.
Forensic examiners of computer systems are called on to answer both simple and complex
questions relating to crimes. Investigators may need to know something as simple as whether
a particular document can be located on a computer or when the document was created or
printed. In some cases, digital evidence may provide a decisive lead, such as the floppy diskette
that was sent by the Bind Torture Kill (BTK) serial killer to a television station and contained data
that led investigators to a computer in the church where Dennis Rader was council president.
Computers also have physical properties that can be embedded in the digital evidence they pro-
duce. The electronics in every digital camera has unique properties that specialized forensic an-
alysts can utilize to link digital photographs to a specific device (Fridrich et al., 2005; Geradts
et al., 2005). Some color printers place their serial number on pages in millimeter-sized yellow
dots that are only visible under certain light frequencies, enabling investigators to associate an
item with a particular printer (Tuohey, 2004). A person’s Internet communications and digital
documents contain verbal evidence that forensic linguists can analyze to learn more about a vic-
tim or offender (Chaski, 2005).
Information stored and created on computers can be used to answer fundamental questions
relating to a crime, including what happened when (sequencing), who was responsible531 # 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
532 17. RECONSTRUCTING DIGITAL EVIDENCE(attribution), and the origination of a particular item (evaluation of source). At the same time, the
complexity of computer systems requires appreciation that individual pieces of digital evidence
may havemultiple interpretations, and corroborating informationmay be vital to reaching a cor-
rect conclusion. Forensic examiners need to understand, and make regular use of, the scientific
method to ensure that conclusions reached are solidly based in fact. Familiarity with the limi-
tations of forensic examinations of digital evidence will help investigators and attorneys excul-
pate the innocent and apprehend modern criminals.
This chapter presents the use of digital evidence to reconstruct actions taken in furtherance of
a crime, providing case examples to demonstrate key concepts. The focus of this chapter is on
how digital evidence can be useful in violent crime investigations. Specifically, this chapter de-
scribes how digital evidence that is handled and interpreted properly can be used to apprehend
offenders, authenticate documents, assess alibis and statements, and determine intent. Other
approaches to analyzing digital evidence and underlying technical details are beyond the scope
of this text. For more in-depth, technical coverage of how forensic science is applied to com-
puters and networks, see Casey (2004).OVERVIEW OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE
Computers can be involved directly in many types of criminal activities, including terrorism,
organized crime, stalking, and child exploitation. For example, sex offenders and obsessional
harassers use computers to threaten and control victims, making the computer an instrument
of the crime as well as the storage container of evidence relating to the crime. For forensic pur-
poses, it is generally not computers themselves that are of primary interest but, rather, data they
contain. Digital evidence is defined as any data stored or transmitted using a computer that sup-
port or refute a theory of how an offense occurred or that address critical elements of the offense,
such as intent or alibi (Casey, 2004). Homicide, sexual assault, and other violent crimes can in-
volve digital evidence from a wide range of sources, including personal computers, handheld
devices, servers, and the Internet, helping investigators reconstruct events and gain insight into
the state of mind of individuals.
The digital footprints we leave as we move through the world create cybertrails that inves-
tigators can retrace to determine what we were doing, where, and when. Third parties, such as
mobile telephone providers, banks, credit card companies, and electronic toll collection systems,
can reveal significant information about an individual’s whereabouts and activities. The com-
puters we use at home and work contain remnants of documents, photographs, Internet com-
munications, and other details that generally reveal a great deal about our daily life, inner
thoughts, and motivations. Data that have been “deleted” often remain on a computer indefi-
nitely, and technically savvy individuals can store data in unused areas of a hard disk. A victim’s
handheld device may contain entries or photographs that indicate where she was or who she
met at a particular time. Records from a missing person’s mobile telephone provider or car nav-
igation system may indicate where he went. Computers could contain details about a murder
plot, from a to-do list in a personal digital assistant to communications between coconspirators.
A trained forensic examiner can recover and use these data to reveal evidence that a criminal
sought to hide and glean a great deal about an individual and his activities.
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searches and other data reduction techniques, as well as reconstruction tools such as timelines
and link charts. Some link analysis tools can import e-mail and other digital data to help inves-
tigators identify patterns and relationships. Figure 17.1 depicts an example of how the contents
of a short message service (SMS) message found on the victim’s phone could lead to a suspect
and how the locations of mobile telephones could be used to place the suspect at the crime scene.
Some forms of digital evidence contain additional information, called metadata, that special-
ists can extract to aide an investigation. Consider the following data embedded in a Microsoft
Word document extracted using Metadata Assistant (www.payneconsulting.com), which
reveals when the document was originally created, when it was last modified and printed,
the various file names of the document, and the names of the last 10 authors:
Document Name: suicide-note.doc
Path: C:\Documents and Settings\Jane Doe\Desktop\
Document Format: Word Document
Built-in Document Properties:
Built-in Properties Containing Metadata: 3
Title: Note
Author: John Doe
Company: Personal
Document Statistics:
Document Statistics Containing Metadata: 6
Creation Date: 7/22/2005 4:31:00 PM
Last Save Time: 6/19/2005 1:58:00 PM
Time Last Printed: 6/19/2005 1:44:00 PM
Last Saved By: Jane Doe
Revision Number: 3Victim’s 
mobile 
telephone 
Telephone  
company core 
systems 
Unknown 
individual’s
telephone 
SMS message
“Meet me in half 
an hour on the 
corner of 8th and
Main Street.” 
10:05
Victim’s 
mobile 
telephone
Telephone  
company core 
systems 
Unknown 
individual’s
telephone 
10:35 – 10:40 
Victim found 
dead on the 
corner of 8th
and Main 
Street.
10:50
FIGURE 17.1 Links between victim and suspect established using an SMS message and the location of the mobile
telephone at given times.
534 17. RECONSTRUCTING DIGITAL EVIDENCETotal Edit Time (Minutes): 5 Minutes
Last 10 authors:
Has Last 10 Data
Author: John Doe Path: A:\note.doc
Author: John Doe Path: C:\Documents and Settings\John Doe\Application Data\Microsoft
\Word\AutoRecovery save of note.asd
Author: John Doe Path: A:\note.doc
Author: Jane Doe Path: A:\note.doc
Author: Jane Doe Path: C:\Documents and Settings\Jane Doe\Desktop\ suicide-note.doc
Track Changes:
Tracked Changes: 1. Tracked Changes are On.
1 Type: Delete Author: Jane Doe
My husband did not kill me.
Location: Main Text
This type of embedded metadata can answer a variety of questions regarding a document,
including its provenance and authenticity. For instance, although this document appears to have
been last printed and saved on 6/19/2005, the original creation date suggests that it was not
created until more than 1 month later on 7/22/2005. This date sequence is explained through
examination of the last 10 authors, which reveals that the document named “note.doc” was orig-
inally created on a floppy diskette using John Doe’s computer (corresponding to the “Creation
Date” of 7/22/2005) and was subsequently transferred to Jane Doe’s computer, where it was
saved as “suicide-note.doc” and given a “Last Saved Time” on 6/19/2005, possibly because
the clock on Jane Doe’s computer had been backdated. Metadata also show that the line “My
husband did not kill me” was deleted from the document at some time. A forensic examination
of the computers and floppy diskette would likely uncover remnants of the note on the hus-
band’s computer, additional temporal information showing when the document was actually
created and transferred onto the wife’s computer, and other data that would help determine
who wrote the note and gain insight into the author’s intent.
As another example of the investigative usefulness of digital evidence, e-mail and AOL
Instant Messages provided the compelling evidence to convict ShareeMiller of conspiring to kill
her husband and abetting the suicide of the admitted killer (an ex-cop named Jerry Cassaday),
whom she had seduced. Miller used their Internet correspondences to control Cassaday’s per-
ception of her husband, as demonstrated in the following excerpt from one of their online chat
sessions (Bean, 2003).
[Sharee Miller] twice told Cassaday she was pregnant with his babies—even though she’d had her tubes tied
after her third child. In a chat session on Sept. 23, 1999, Miller wrote, “This next part will be hard—I lost my baby,
Jerry.”
“No,” Cassaday replied.
“I never thought I would ever tell you that he hits. I got in trouble because I was with you,” she continued.
Cassaday wanted to know more.
“Sharee, you can tell me now, or in person when I beat it out of him.”
“It made me start having bad thoughts of killing him,” she wrote.
“Where did he hit you?” Cassaday asked.
“Jerry, I can’t tell you.” But Cassaday insisted.
“He didn’t hit me, Jerry; he raped me—I lost the baby because of the force.”
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home computer contained a fake suicide note created after his wife’s death (State of South Dakota
v. William Boyd Guthrie, 2001). On May 14, 1999, Doctor Guthrie, a Presbyterian minister, called
911 for emergency assistance because his wife Sharon was unconscious in the bathtub. Sharon
later died in the hospital. Based on the amount of temazepam and other agents in her system, a
forensic pathologist determined that her death was not natural and not accidental, but from the
autopsy alone he could not resolve whether it was suicide or homicide. A computer specialist
examined the contents of the computer inWilliamGuthrie’s church office and found evidence of
numerous Web searches on subjects related to household accidents, bathtub accidents, and pre-
scription drugs. Some of these Internet activities occurred at approximately the same times as
earlier suspicious accidents in the Guthrie household. In April 1999, 2 days after Web pages
describing various drugs including temazepam were viewed on the computer in the church of-
fice, William Guthrie visited his doctor complaining of insomnia and persuaded the doctor to
prescribe him temazepam. The defense argued that Sharon Guthrie had committed suicide
and produced a purported suicide note that Guthrie claimed he discovered in his church office
3 weeks after Sharon drowned. The unsigned note was dated the day before Sharon’s death and
was addressed to her daughter. The note, replicated here with its spacing and typographical
errors, was apparently created on a computer:
May 13,1999
Dear Suzanne,
I am sorry I ruined your wedding, Your dad told me about your concerns of my Interfering in Jenalu’s and the
possibility I might ruin hers. I won’t be there so Put your mind at ease. You will understand after the wedding is
done. I love you all Mom.
Because there was insufficient time for experts to examine all of the fingerprints on the note,
only four fingerprints were analyzed, none of which could be attributed to a specific individual.
The computer specialist was called on again, this time to examine Guthrie’s home computer, and
he found an earlier draft of the suicide note. However, the file on the computer had been created
on August 7, 1999. William Guthrie denied that he created this note but admitted to creating
another note on August 11 that was found on his home computer with Sharon again as the pur-
ported author. It listed various grievances Sharon addressed to Guthrie, including one line that
stated, “I’m upset that you have had an affair and have not come cleanwithme, I have thought of
ending my life and you would have to face up to it. Believe me I known how to do it.” Guthrie
claimed that he wrote this note to work through the emotional trauma of Sharon’s death. Wil-
liam Boyd Guthrie was convicted of first-degree murder for the killing of his wife.
William Guthrie was evidently unaware of the digital traces he was leaving behind. As crim-
inals become more aware of these cybertrails, however, they are taking steps to conceal their
digital footprints. This concealment behavior includes changing their computer clock to hamper
reconstruction, encrypting data to restrict access, and using disk-cleaning tools to destroy digital
evidence. One disk-cleaning tool, Evidence Eliminator (www.evidence-eliminator.com/prod-
uct.d2w), is specifically advertised as a program that defends against digital forensic examina-
tion tools such as EnCase.
Other forms of evidence dynamics can make crime reconstruction using digital data more
difficult. Digital evidence can be lost if it is not seized in a forensically sound or timely manner,
as any use of a computer can overwrite existing data. Relevant network data may be similarly
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ital crime scenes processed by qualified professionals to ensure that the evidence is preserved
properly and examined thoroughly.DIGITAL CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION
Computers and networks should be considered an extension of the crime scene, even
when they are not involved directly in facilitating the crime. It is useful to think of them as
secondary crime scenes. Like a physical crime scene, digital crime scenes can contain many
pieces of evidence, and it is necessary to apply forensic principles to preserve, document,
and search the entire scene. A single computer can contain e-mail communications between
the victim and the offender, evidence of intent to commit a crime, incriminating digital photo-
graphs taken by the offender as trophies, and software applications used to conceal digital
evidence.
Untrained individuals commonly make the mistake of turning on a computer and looking for
a particular item of evidence. The act of turning on and operating a computer is comparable to
trampling a crime scene, thereby destroying useful evidence and making it more difficult to re-
construct the crime. To preserve the state of a digital crime scene, professionals make a duplicate
copy of the evidence using tools that do not alter the original. At the same time, they document
the context of the evidence by making notes and photographs and by calculating hash values of
the evidence. A hash value is a formula that reads data comprising a piece of digital evidence
and calculates a unique “fingerprint” that can be used to identify and verify the evidence. The
verification process is accomplished by recalculating the hash value of the evidence at any time
and ensuring that it is the same as the originally calculated value. After preserving and docu-
menting the digital crime scene, forensic professionals perform their examination on the dupli-
cate copy to locate relevant items, determine their provenance, and answer other questions of
interest to investigators.
Only searching for a particular piece of evidence on a computer is like walking into a
victim’s home just to collect a suicide note without examining the scene for signs of staging.
In the United Kingdom case involving Dr. Harold Shipman, changes he made to computerized
medical records on his medical office computer system were instrumental in convicting him for
killing hundreds of patients. Following Shipman’s arrest, police made an exact copy of the hard
drive from his computer, thus preserving a complete and accurate duplicate of the digital evi-
dence. By analyzing the computer application Shipman used to maintain patient records, inves-
tigators found that the program kept an audit trail, recording changes made to patient records.
This audit trail indicated that Shipman had lied about patients’ symptoms and made backdated
modifications to records to conceal the murders. Had the investigators accepted the patient
records without digging deeper into their authenticity, they would have missed this key piece
of evidence about the cover-up attempt. During his trial, Shipman claimed that he was familiar
with this audit trail feature and was sufficiently knowledgeable about computers to falsify the
audit trail if he had actually been trying to hide these activities. However, the court was con-
vinced that Shipman had altered the records to conceal his crimes and sentenced him to life
in prison.
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Although computers can provide investigators with many tantalizing leads, digital evidence
is not alwayswhat it seems and can bemisinterpreted. At its basic level, digital evidence exists in
a physical medium, such as a magnetic disk, a copper wire, or a radio signal in the air. Forensic
examiners rarely scrutinize the physical medium and instead use computers to translate data
into a form that humans can interpret, such as text, audio, or video. Therefore, examiners rarely
see actual data but only a representation, and each layer of abstraction can lose information and
introduce errors. For instance, analyzing the magnetic properties of a hard drive may reveal
additional information useful for some investigations (e.g., overwritten data and the cause of
damage to the disk). The risk of examining media at this low level is that the act of observing
may cause changes that could destroy or undermine the evidence.
As described in the previous section, it is considered best practice to examine an exact replica
of digital evidence to avoid altering the original. However, it can be difficult to obtain an exact
and complete copy of amagnetic disk, RandomAccessMemory, a copper wire, or a radio signal.
For instance, programmatic mistakes (a.k.a. bugs) have been found in tools for collecting digital
evidence from hard drives, resulting in only a portion of data being copied. Bugs have also been
found in tools for examining digital evidence on computers, resulting in an inaccurate represen-
tation of the underlying data, as shown in Figure 17.2.
There are many other potential sources of error in digital evidence between the time data are
created by a system and the time of preservation and analysis of the evidence. For instance, sys-
tem malfunction can result in erroneous or missing log entries. Also, as with other forms of
evidence, poor training or lack of experience can lead forensic examiners to mishandle orFIGURE 17.2 A folder named “tk” contained important evidence. The tk folder is visible using a newer version of a
digital evidence examination tool (left) but not an older version containing a bug (right).
1 Some examples in this section are based on Casey (2005).
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caused a defense expert to conclude incorrectly that police had operated the suspect’s computer
(Forster, 2004).
Digital evidence should always be interpreted in context. For example, the mere presence of
an incriminating file on a person’s computer may not be sufficient to demonstrate guilt if there is
strong indicia that the file was placed on the system by a virus, intruder, or via a Web browser
vulnerability without the user’s knowledge. An analysis of the file, its location, security vulner-
abilities, artifacts of system usage, and other contextual clues may help determine how a file
came to be on a given system.
Similarly, a file with a creation date that is after its last modified date may be interpreted
incorrectly as evidence that the system clock was backdated. In fact, the last written date of a
file does not necessarily imply that the file was modified on the computer on which it is found.
Copying a file onto a computer from removable media or another system on a network may not
change the last written date, resulting in a file with a modified date prior to its creation date.
There are many other nuances to digital evidence caused by the intricacies of computer
operations that can cause confusion or misinterpretation, and the same holds for networks.
The Internet Protocol (IP)2 address in an e-mail header may lead investigators to a particular
computer, but this does not necessarily establish that the owner of that computer sent the mes-
sage. Given the minor amount of effort required to conceal one’s identity on the Internet, crim-
inals usually take some action to thwart apprehension. This may be as simple as using a library
computer or as sophisticated as inserting someone else’s IP address into the e-mail header, re-
quiring investigators to take additional steps to identify the culprit.
Consider a harassment case in which the offender sends the victim threatening e-mail via an
intermediate server. Normally, the e-mail message would contain information about the com-
puter used to send the message. Specifically, the e-mail header would contain the IP address of
the sender’s computer. However, because the harasser sent the message via an intermediate
server, the e-mail header will contain the IP address of that server and conceal the actual source.
For example, headers in the following e-mail sent from a Yahoo! account indicate that the mes-
sage was sent from an IP address in Japan (210.249.120.210):
To: Count Rugen
From: “Inigo Montoya”< inigo_montoya@yahoo.com >
X-Originating-IP: 210.249.120.210
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2003 03:51:45 -0000
Subject: Prepare to die!
However, the sender merely connected to Yahoo! via this computer in Japan. Therefore,
additional investigation would be required to determine the actual source of the message.
Log files from the intermediate computer, such as those shown next, might contain the IP ad-
dress of the actual sender’s computer (172.16.34.14 in this example):
172.16.34.14, anonymous, 6/4/03, 03:43:24, 210.249.120.210, GET, http://mailsrv.yahoo.com/
login.html, 2002 Every computer on the Internet is assigned an IP address to enable delivery of data.
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inigo_montoya/inbox.html, 200
172.16.34.14, anonymous, 6/4/03, 03:45:27, 210.249.120.210, GET, http://mailsrv.yahoo.com/
inigo_montoya/compose.html, 200
172.16.34.14, anonymous, 6/4/03, 03:51:36, 210.249.120.210, GET, http://mailsrv.yahoo.com/
inigo_montoya/sent.html, 200
To mitigate the risks of evidence being missed or misinterpreted, experienced forensic exam-
iners employ a variety of techniques, including comparing the results of multiple tools, validat-
ing important findings through contextual reviews, and analyzing corroborating evidence for
inconsistencies.
The scientific method provides the final bulwark against incorrect conclusions. Simply trying
to validate a theory increases the chance of error—the tendency is for the analysis to be skewed
in favor of the hypothesis. This is why the most effective investigators suppress their personal
biases and hunches and why they seek evidence and perform experiments to disprove their
working theory. Experimentation is actually a natural part of analyzing digital evidence. Given
the variety and complexity of hardware and software, it is not feasible for forensic examiners to
know everything about every software and hardware configuration. As a result, it is often nec-
essary to perform controlled experiments to learn more about a given computer system or pro-
gram. For instance, one approach is to pose the questions, “Was it possible to perform a given
action using the subject computer, and if so, what evidence of this action is left behind on the
system?” Theories about what digital evidence reveals in a particular case may be tested by
restoring a duplicate copy of a subject system onto similar hardware, effectively creating a clone
that can be operated to study the effects of various actions. Similarly, it may be necessary to per-
form experiments on a certain computer program to distinguish between actions that are auto-
mated by the program and those performed by a user action.
One useful by-product of this type of analysis is exemplars of files or other artifacts created by
certain actions. Comparing an item of evidence to an exemplar can reveal investigatively useful
class characteristics or even individual characteristics. In one case, the offender claimed that he
could not remember the password protecting his encryption key because he had changed it
recently. By experimenting with the same encryption program on a test system, the forensic
examiner observed that changing the password updated the last modified date of the file con-
taining the encryption key. An examination of the file containing the suspect’s encryption key
indicated that it had not been altered recently as the suspect claimed. Faced with this informa-
tion, the suspect admitted that he had lied about changing the password.
In addition to presenting the facts in a case, investigators are generally expected to render an
opinion about the evidence. For instance, when a program such as Evidence Eliminator is found
on a suspect’s computer, the forensic examiner will generally be asked if there is any evidence of
its use. It is not sufficient for a forensic examiner to conclude that Evidence Eliminator was used
simply because it was installed on a computer. The following is an example of how this finding
might be phrased:
Evidence Eliminator was almost definitely run on this system. The presence of a folder named “eetemp” and a
detailed log file named “EElog.txt” created by Evidence Eliminator, indicate that this program was used on the
subject system and was last run on 3/07/05 at 19:29. Many files referenced in the “EElog.txt” log file were altered
or overwritten on 3/07/05 at 19:29, which supports the finding that Evidence Eliminator was run on the subject
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which is consistent with the use of a wiping program.
Analysis of digital evidence requires interpretation that forms the basis of any conclusions
reached. Investigators should assess the level of certainty underlying each conclusion in order
to help the fact-finder determine what weight to attach. The C-Scale (Certainty Scale) described
in Casey (2004, Chapter 7) provides a method for conveying certainty when referring to digital
evidence and qualifying conclusions appropriately. Some digital investigators use a less formal
system of degrees of likelihood that can be used in both the affirmative and the negative sense:
(1) almost definitely, (2) most probably, (3) probably, (4) very possibly, and (5) possibly.
Whenever possible, investigators should support assertionswith available sources of relevant
evidence. Clearly state how and where the digital evidence was found to help fact finders inter-
pret the findings and to enable another competent examiner to verify the results. Presenting
alternative scenarios and demonstrating why they are less reasonable and less consistent with
the evidence can help strengthen key conclusions. Explaining why other explanations are un-
likely or impossible is a respected facet of the scientific method that can be applied to examina-
tion of digital evidence and demonstrate that a particular conclusion withstood critical scrutiny.
If there is no evidence to support an alternative scenario, state whether it is more likely that rel-
evant evidence was missed or simply not present. If digital evidence was altered after it was
collected, it is crucial to mention this in the report, explaining the cause of the alterations and
weighing their impact on the case (e.g., negligible or severe).
Two similar scenarios are presented here to demonstrate that apparently minor differences in
the circumstances can lead to significantly different conclusions, with different levels of
certainty.
EXAMPLES
Conclusion 1
At 17:57 EDT on 05/16/2005, shortly after the incriminating activities occurred on the computer,
Evidence Eliminator appears to have been run. Although Jack Smith and Jane Doe were the primary
users of this computer, a passwordwas not required and it was in a location thatwas accessible tomany
people in the building. Evidence Eliminator was run at a time when both Mr. Smith and Ms. Doe were
at another location and could not have accessed the computer remotely. The subject computer does not
maintain a record of clock changes and there is no evidence to prove or disprove that the clock was
tampered with. It is possible that Mr. Smith or Ms. Doe changed the computer clock to make it appear
that Evidence Eliminator was run at a time when they would not be implicated. It is also possible that
an unknown third party accessed the computer and ran Evidence Eliminator.
Conclusion 2
Although Evidence Eliminator appears to have been run on the subject computer shortly after the
incriminating activities occurred on the computer at 17:57 EDT on 05/16/2005, there is evidence that
the clock was tampered with. Based on temporal discontinuities in the Windows Event log, Evidence
Eliminator was actually run at 11:45 that morning. Jack Smith and Jane Doe were the primary users of
this computer, and they each had their own username and password. Windows Event logs show that
Jane Doe’s account was used to log into the computer at 11:24 on the date in question and logged out at
541ATTRIBUTION USING DIGITAL EVIDENCE11:50. The computerwas located in a room that required a key card to access, and the security logs show
that JaneDoe’s cardwas used to access the room at 11:20. Furthermore, security cameras show JaneDoe
walking through the hall leading to the room at 11:19 and walking away from the room at 11:53. There-
fore, it was almost definitely Jane Doe who committed the crime, altered the clock, and ran Evidence
Eliminator on the subject computer.ATTRIBUTION USING DIGITAL EVIDENCE
Digital evidence can play a direct role in identifying and apprehending offenders, helping
investigators establish linkages between people and their online activities. This attribution pro-
cess can be challenging using digital evidence alone, but when combined with traditional inves-
tigative techniques, these data can provide the necessary clues to track down criminals. For
instance, a lead developed during a serial homicide investigation in St. Louis when a reporter
received a letter from the killer. The letter contained a map of a specific area with a handwritten
“X” to indicate where another body could be found. After investigators found a skeleton in that
area, they inspected the letter more closely for ways to link it to the killer. The FBI determined
that themap in the letter was fromExpedia.com and immediately contacted the site to determine
if there was any useful digital evidence. The Web server logs on Expedia.com showed that only
one IP address (65.227.106.78) had accessed themap aroundMay 21, the date the letter was post-
marked. The ISP responsible for this IP address was able to provide the account information
and telephone number that had been used to make the connection in question. Both the dial-
up account and telephone number used to make this connection belonged to Maury Travis
(Robinson, 2002).
In short, the act of downloading the online map included in the letter left traces on the Expe-
diaWeb server, on Travis’s ISP, and on his personal computer. Investigators arrested Travis and
found incriminating evidence in his home, including a torture chamber and a videotape of him-
self torturing and raping a number of women and apparently strangling one victim. Travis com-
mitted suicide while in custody and the full extent of his crimes may never be known.
In another case, Dartmouth professors Susanne and Half Zantop were stabbed in their homes
with SOG Seal 2000 knives. Investigators tracked purchases of this type of knife through Internet
sites, leading them to two local teenagers, James Parker and Robert Tulloch. A forensic exam-
ination of the boys’ computers revealed that, after being interviewed by police, they contacted
each other over AOL Instant Messenger and agreed to flee to California. Two knives were found
in Tulloch’s bedroom with blood matching the Zantops, and the boys were apprehended and
confessed to the killings (CBS News, 2001).
However, attributing computer activities to a particular individual can be challenging. For
instance, logs showing that a particular Internet account was used to commit a crime do not
prove that the owner of that account was responsible, as someone else could have used the
individual’s account. Even when dealing with a specific computer and a known suspect, some
investigative and forensic stepsmay be required to place the person at the keyboard and confirm
that the activities on the computer were most likely those of the suspect. Considering the mobile
telephone example at the beginning of this chapter (see Figure 17.1), it may only be possible for
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sage at 10:05 and that the suspect’s phone was in the same vicinity as the victim at the time of the
murder. Other evidence would be required to establish that the suspect was in possession of his
phone at these times and to place him at the crime scene.
Attributing a crime to an individual becomes even more difficult when a crime is committed
via an open wireless access point or from a publicly accessible computer, such as at an Internet
cafe or public library terminal. In one extortion case, investigators followed the main suspects
and observed one of them use a library computer from which incriminating e-mails had been
sent (Howell, 2004; Khamsi, 2005).
Using evidence frommultiple independent sources to corroborate each other and develop an
accurate picture of events can help develop a strong association between an individual and com-
puter activities. This type of reconstruction can involve traditional investigative techniques,
such as stakeouts. For instance, a man accused of possessing child pornography argued that
all evidence found in his home should be suppressed because investigators had not provided
sufficient probable cause in their search warrant to conclude that it was in fact he, and not an
imposter, who was using his Internet account to traffic in child pornography (U.S. v. Grant,
2000). During their investigation into an online child exploitation group, investigators deter-
mined that one member of the group had connected to the Internet using a dial-up account reg-
istered to Grant. Upon further investigation, they found that Grant also had a high-speed
Internet connection from his home that was used as an FTP server—the type of file-transfer
server required for membership in the child exploitation group.
Coincidentally, while tapping a telephone not associated with Grant in relation to another
child pornography case, investigators observed that one of the participants in a secret online chat
room was connected via Grant’s dial-up account. Contemporaneous surveillance of the defen-
dant’s home revealed that both his and his wife’s car were parked outside their residence at the
time. The court believed that there was enough corroborating evidence to establish a solid cir-
cumstantial connection between the defendant and the crime to support probable cause for the
search warrant.DIGITAL DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATION
The author of a document and the date it was created can be significant, as demonstrated in
the Guthrie case described at the beginning of this chapter. In that case, the offender was not
technically savvy enough to change his computer’s clock to an earlier date to give the impression
that the document was created prior to his wife’s death. Such staging can make it more difficult
to determine who wrote a document and when it was created. However, there are various
approaches that forensic examiners can use to authenticate a digital document.
Forensic examiners can use date stamps on files and in log files to determine the provenance
of a document such as a suicide note even when the digital crime scene is staged. For instance, it
is possible to detect staging and document falsification by searching for chronological inconsis-
tencies in log files and file date stamps. Nuances in the way computers maintain different date
stamps can help forensic examiners reconstruct aspects of the creation andmodification of a doc-
ument. In addition, certain types of files, such as Microsoft Word, contain embedded
543DIGITAL DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATIONinformation that can be useful for authenticating a document. This embedded information may
include the last printed date and the last 10 file names and authors, as shown previously.
EXAMPLE
According to Joe Smith, he created the questioned document in January 2005. However, dates
associated with this document show that it was actually created in May 2005 and subsequently back-
dated to January. This fact is supported by dates in file slack of this document from April 2005 and by
dates in a temporary copy created while the document was being edited using Microsoft Word in May
2005. Furthermore, Windows Security Event log entries from May 2005 show that the clock was back-
dated to January 2005 and subsequently returned to the correct date (Figure 17.3). In conclusion, the
questioned document was created in May 2005 and not in January as claimed by Joe Smith.
The arrangement of data on storagemedia (a.k.a. digital stratigraphy) can provide supporting
evidence in such forensic examinations. For instance, when a forensic examiner finds a ques-
tioned document that was purportedly created in January 2005 lying on top of a deleted docu-
ment that was created in April 2005, staging should be suspected because the newer file should
not be overwritten by an older one. Although the usefulness of digital stratigraphy for document
authentication can be undermined by some disk optimization programs that reposition data on a
hard drive, it can also be aided by the process. In one case, the suspect defragmented his hard
drive prior to fabricating a document. The forensic examiner determined that the defragmenta-
tion process had been executed in 2003, causing all data on the disk to be reorganized onto a
particular portion of the disk. The questioned documents that were purportedly created in
1999 were the only files on the system that were not arranged neatly in this area of the disk,
which addedweight to the conclusion that the questioned documentswere actually created after
the defragmentation process had been executed in 2003 (Friedberg, 2004).FIGURE 17.3 Windows Security Event log fromMay 2005 contains entries with January date stamps, indicating that
the clock was backdated.
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Different file formats have characteristics that may be associated with their source. As shown
previously, Microsoft Office documents contain embedded information, such as printer names,
directory locations, names of authors, and creation/modification date–time stamps, that can be
useful for determining their source. These embedded characteristics can be used to associate a
piece of evidence with a specific computer. Earlier versions of Microsoft Office also embedded a
unique identifier in files, called a globally unique identifier, which can be used to identify the
computer that was used to create a given document (Leach and Salz, 1998). More subtle evalu-
ations of source involve the association of data fragments with a particular originating file or
determining if a given computer was used to alter a piece of evidence.
When a suspect’s computer contains photographs relating to a crime, it may not be safe to
assume that the suspect created those photographs. It is possible that the files were copied from
another system or downloaded from the Internet. Forensic analysis of the photographs may be
necessary to extract class characteristics consistent with the suspect’s digital camera or flatbed
scanner. The scanner may have a scratch or flaw that appears in the photographs or the files may
contain information that was embedded by the digital camera, such as the make and model of
the camera and the date and time the photograph was taken. This embedded metadata could be
used to demonstrate that a photograph was likely taken using a suspect’s camera rather than
downloaded from the Internet.
If these kinds of metadata are not available in a digital photograph, it may be possible to use
other characteristics of a photograph to determine its source. For instance, Europol’s Excalibur
system uses image recognition technology to search a database of photographs from past inves-
tigations for similarities with a given image. If two photographs contain a common component,
such as a piece of fabric with a distinct design, this may indicate that they were taken in the same
place, providing investigators with a lead.
If incriminating files found on a computer were downloaded from the Internet, investigators
maywant to locate the originating computer and search it for evidence relating to the crime. This
can involve reconstructing the computer user’s Internet activities to determine where the files
were obtained. It may also be necessary to examine e-mail headers, logs, and other artifacts of
network activity to determine where digital evidence came from.ASSESSING ALIBIS AND STATEMENTS
Offenders, victims, and offenders may mislead investigators intentionally or inadvertently,
claiming that something occurred or that they were somewhere at a particular time. By cross-
referencing such information with the digital traces left behind by a person’s activities, digital
evidence may be found to support or refute a statement or alibi. In one homicide investigation,
the prime suspect claimed that he was out of town at the time of the crime. Although his com-
puter suffered from a Y2K bug that renderedmost of the date–time stamps on his computer use-
less, e-mail messages sent and received by the suspect showed that he was at home when the
murder occurred, contrary to his original statement. Caught in a lie, the suspect admitted to
the crime.
545DETERMINING MOTIVATION AND INTENTAs another example, data relating tomobile telephoneswere instrumental in the conviction of
IanHuntley for themurder ofHollyWells and Jessica Chapman in the United Kingdom. The last
communication from Jessica’s mobile phone was sent to a cell tower several miles away in Bur-
well rather than a local tower in Soham (BBC, 2003). The police provided a mobile telephone
specialist with a map of the route they thought the girls would have taken, and the specialist
determined that the only place on that route where the phone could have connected to the cell
tower in Burwell was from inside or just outside Huntley’s house (Summers, 2003). In addition,
Huntley’s alibi was that he was with his friend Maxine Carr on the night the girls went missing,
but Carr’s mobile phone records indicated that she was out of town at the time.
Investigators should not rely on one piece of digital evidence when examining an alibi: they
should search for an associated cybertrail. On many computers, minimal skills are required to
change the clock or the creation time of a file. Also, people can program a computer to perform
an action, such as sending an e-mail message, at a specific time. Inmany cases, scheduling events
does not require any programming skill—it is a simple feature of the operating system. Simi-
larly, IP addresses can be changed and concealed, allowing individuals to pretend that they
are connected to a network from another location. In addition, the location information associ-
ated with mobile telephones is not exact and does not place an individual at a specific location.
As noted previously, it can also be difficult to prove who was using the mobile telephone at a
specific time, particularly when telephones or subscriber identity module cards are shared
among members of a group or family.DETERMINING MOTIVATION AND INTENT
Clear evidence of intent, such as an offender’s diary, may be found on a computer. Other
pieces of digital datamight not be useful on their own, but patterns of behavior can emergewhen
the pieces of digital evidence are combined with other information about a person’s actions.
Examples of this were observed in Shipman’s modification of patient records and in Guthrie’s
Web searches described at the beginning of the chapter. In another case, prosecutors upgraded
the charge against Robert Durall from second-degree to first-degree murder based on Internet
searches found on his computer with key words including “kill þ spouse,” “accidental þ
deaths,” “smothering,” and “murder” (Johnson, 2000). In child exploitation cases, an offender’s
computer may contain evidence of soliciting and grooming victims over the Internet.
In David Westerfield’s homicide trial, the prosecution claimed that Westerfield’s digital por-
nography collection reflected his fantasies relating to kidnapping and killing 7-year-old Danielle
van Dam and, in closing arguments, insinuated that the pornography motivated Westerfield to
victimize the child (California v. Westerfield, 2002):
Not only does he have the young girls involved in sex, but he has the anime that you saw. And we will not
show them to you again. The drawings of the young girls being sexually assaulted. Raped. Digitally penetrated.
Exposed. Forcibly sodomized. Why does he have those, a normal 50-year-old man? Those are his fantasies. His
choice. Those are what he wants. He picked them; he collected them. Those are his fantasies. That’s what gets him
excited. That’s what he wants in his collection. . . . When you have those fantasies, fantasies breed need. He got to
the point where it was growing and growing and growing. And what else is there to collect? What else can I get
excited about visually, audibly?
546 17. RECONSTRUCTING DIGITAL EVIDENCEForensic examinations of computers can reveal other behavior that can be very useful for
determining intent. For instance, evidence of clock tampering may enable a forensic examiner
to conclude that the computer owner intentionally backdated a digital document. Also, disk
cleaning or encryption programs on a computer can be used to demonstrate a computer owner’s
conscious decision to destroy or conceal incriminating digital evidence. However, these same
actions may have innocent explanations and must be considered in context before reaching a
definitive conclusion.CONCLUSION
Digital evidence can help answer many questions in an investigation, ranging from the
whereabouts of a victim at a given time to the state of mind of the offender. Therefore, evidence
on computers and networks should be included whenever feasible in crime reconstructions.
At the same time, care must be taken when interpreting the abstracted behavioral evidence that
is stored on computers. People use technology in creative ways that can complicate the recon-
struction process, particularly when attempts are made to conceal digital evidence. Computers
also have many subsystems that interact in ways that can complicate the reconstruction process.
In all cases, given the malleability and multivalent nature of digital evidence, it is necessary to
seek corroborating evidence from multiple independent sources. The risk of missing or misin-
terpreting important details highlights the importance of utilizing the scientific method to reach
objective conclusions that are solidly based on the evidence.SUMMARY
Digital evidence is defined as any data stored or transmitted using a computer that support or
refute a theory of how an offense occurred or that address critical elements of the offense, such as
intent or alibi. Homicide, sexual assault, and other violent crimes can involve digital evidence
from awide range of sources, including personal computers, handheld devices, servers, and the
Internet, helping investigators reconstruct events and gain insight into the state of mind of
individuals. A basic knowledge of these, and how they operate, is required for a complete
investigation and reconstruction.
Computers and networks should be considered an extension of the crime scene, even when
they are not involved directly in facilitating the crime. It is useful to think of them as secondary
crime scenes. Like a physical crime scene, digital crime scenes can contain many pieces of
evidence, and it is necessary to apply forensic principles to preserve, document, and search
the entire scene. A single computer can contain e-mail communications between the victim
and the offender, evidence of intent to commit a crime, incriminating digital photographs taken
by the offender as trophies, and software applications used to conceal digital evidence. Digital
evidence that is handled and interpreted properly can be used to apprehend offenders, authen-
ticate documents, assess alibis and statements, and determine intent.
Information stored and created on computers can be used to answer fundamental questions
relating to a crime, including what happened when (sequencing), who was responsible (attribu-
tion), and the origination of a particular item (evaluation of source). At the same time, the
547ACKNOWLEDGMENTScomplexity of computer systems requires appreciation that individual pieces of digital evidence
may havemultiple interpretations, and corroborating informationmay be vital to reaching a cor-
rect conclusion. Forensic examiners need to understand, and make regular use of, the scientific
method to ensure that conclusions reached are based solidly in fact. Familiarity with the limi-
tations of forensic examinations of digital evidence will help investigators and attorneys excul-
pate the innocent and apprehend modern criminals.QUESTIONS
1. Define digital evidence.
2. Explain what a cybertrail is and how it is useful in reconstruction efforts.
3. Computers and networks can be thought of as __________ of crime scenes.
4. The act of turning on and operating a computer destroys useful evidence and makes it more
difficult to reconstruct the crime. True or false?
5. List one source of error that may occur in digital evidence between the time data are created
by a system and the time of preservation and analysis of the evidence.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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